Research Article

Left Radical Movements in the World: Political and Legal Features

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Abstract

Background: In most Latin American states, a revolutionary situation persists after the Second World War. Left-wing radical armed groups have intensified guerrilla warfare, especially in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Nicaragua, Peru, and El Salvador.

Objective: to identify the historical characteristics and understand the development of guerilla movements.

Methods: The authors have chosen the case of Colombia since Russia has been strongly influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology at the beginning of the 20th century.

Results: Readers, particularly in Russia, are little familiar with the history of Colombia, the authors dwell on the details of the development of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

Conclusions: authors compared activities of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia with the work of similar movements in Russia, which help readers to better understand the conclusions reached by the authors.

Keywords: Guerilla movements. Colombia. Civil war. Conservatism.

How to cite this article:


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1 INTRODUCTION

Guerrilla movements are a complex phenomenon, differ from each other in form, organizational structure, and ideology, have a unique genesis, history of development, and operation. To understand a certain guerrilla movement, one needs to place the movement in a certain historical, geopolitical, national-cultural, and economic context. Consequently, it is very difficult to talk about these movements as a social phenomenon that has certain typical characteristics. Despite their unique features (the struggle for the independence of Northern Ireland (the Irish Republican Army (the IRA)), opposition to ethnic discrimination (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Sri Lanka), etc.), guerrilla movements have common characteristics. First, the appearance of such groups in the world was a certain defensive reaction to oppression, exploitation, violence, and injustice on the part of their own ruling regime or hostile states (Kalyanaraman, 2003). Guerrilla movements must act in the interests of the population of the territory in which they fight and rely on the support of the population, for example, the Spanish guerrilla in 1808-1813. If guerrilla movements have no support from the population, then such associations are more likely to belong to small groups of "isolated fighters" who are more like extremists (Zelenkov et al., 2021).

Despite the extremely wide range of ideological orientations of partisan movements, in the second half of the 20th century, most of them were radical and used violence against political opponents, and also were based on the principles of hierarchy and internal discipline. None of the armed guerrilla movements (from Irish fighters in the IRA (Fearon, Laitin, 2003) to Jewish rebels in Palestine (Smith, 2003)) wore "white gloves"; did not have a completely unblemished reputation, due to being often involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity (Kalyanaraman, 2003). Violence used by members of armed guerilla formations to achieve their goals remains a source of heated debate and controversy regarding the legitimacy and morality (Kalyanaraman, 2003; Fearon, Laitin, 2003; Smith, 2003; Marshall, Ishiyama, 2016) of this practice. Usually, global militarization took place after the realization that all ways for a peaceful settlement were unavailable, and especially when the ruling regimes used brute force in response to demands and protests (Kalyanaraman, 2003). In such conditions, armed struggle was almost inevitable.

Guerrilla movements became widespread in the second half of the 20th century in many Latin American countries. In the late 1950s, a guerrilla war took place in Cuba, in the early 60s, anti-government demonstrations broke out and continued to expand until the mid-1970s in several countries in the region - Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Guatemala. Such a violent surge of conflict scenarios echoes the geopolitical confrontation between East and West, which is simultaneously superimposed on the postcolonial problems of Latin America (Smith, 2003; Kashina et al., 2021). In terms of ideological alignments and geography, the map of Latin American partisan movements was variegated, and we only note that...
ideological beliefs, political platforms, and goals ranged from Marxist and socialist to right-wing radicals (Ivanovskii, 2011).

Guerrilla tactics, which were widely used from Latin America to Southeast Asia, were an asymmetric response to the military, economic, human, and technical superiority of the enemy. The goal was not to defeat the enemy on the battlefield (although this could also happen) but to create unbearable conditions for the enemy's presence in the controlled territories, increase the cost of political control over the latter, undermine positions in the international arena and force them to negotiate (Fearon, Laitin, 2003). The arsenal of guerilla movements included a wide range of means - the main ones of which were terror, sabotage, boycott, propaganda which were supposed to create a "climate of collapse", i.e. weaken the will of the regime to continue fighting. Most of the guerrilla wars in the world have been conflicts "without rules", or so-called "dirty wars", which were fought by all parties without respecting the norms of international humanitarian law (Smith, 2003).

The armed confrontation between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (FARC - EP), with all the signs of asymmetric war, was not only the longest in the recent history of the macroregion (1964-2016) but also the bloodiest, which took the lives of 218 thousand people (Suárez, 2017), including 177.3 thousand civilians, and 50 thousand missing, and also resulted in more than 5 million refugees (Ivanovskii, 2011), that is, Colombia, was in second place in the world after Sudan according to this dismal indicator.

Thus, the lessons of achieving a national peaceful settlement in Colombia become increasingly more scientifically and practically significant, but the corresponding problem has long remained without the attention of the Russian academic community.

2 ORIGINS OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA

The origins of the bloody confrontation in Colombia go back to the middle of the 20th century when a civil war broke out in the country between supporters of the two leading political parties - the liberal and the conservative. By that time, Colombia was a typical Latin American country where military coups and even short-term armed conflicts took place, but the use of political violence was quite limited. That all changed when on April 9, 1948, the Liberal presidential candidate, Senate President Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who was popular among the poorest for his ideas of state reform, was assassinated.

The erupting Civil War ("La Violencia") lasted almost 10 years, claimed the lives of 200 thousand people (Pizarro, 2004) but ended "in a draw". Therefore, after the overthrow of the dictatorship of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1957, the liberals and conservatives, to prevent similar wars in the future, agreed to alternate presidents every four years and to equally distribute all government and state posts, regardless of the outcome of the elections.

Thus, the rest of the country's political forces were on the sidelines; although this system was officially canceled two decades later, in reality, everything remained unchanged. At the same time, this agreement between liberals and conservatives made it possible to temporarily ensure political
stability and led to a certain growth of the economy of a state rich in natural resources, an agrarian reform, and other transformations began. However, the Communist Party, whose supporters during "La Violencia" fought on the side of the liberals, was extremely unhappy with the bipartisan agreement, as the agreement led to the political marginalization of the party.

Influenced by the Cuban Revolution and the radical left-wing rebel movements inspired by it in the states of Central and South America (Villas Bôas Filho, 2021), two rebel groups appeared in Colombia in 1964. Coming from a family of impoverished farmers, Pedro Antonio Marín, who changed his name to Manuel Marulanda Vélez, together with the radical left student Jacobo Arenas, organized a paramilitary wing of the Communist Party - the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). A group of students who sought to import the revolutionary model of Liberty Island into the country, upon returning from an internship there, created the National Liberation Army (ELN) (Pecaut, 2008).

If the ideology of ELN was a mixture of Marxism, Gevarism, and Liberation theology (Pecaut, 2008), then the FARC first adhered to a radical interpretation of Marxism-Leninism in the spirit of Maoism and viewed the Communist Parties of other states, in particular the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (USSR), as "opportunists" and "revisionists" (Seleznev, 2003). The slogans of universal equality, social justice, and the achievement of communism allowed both groups to receive the support of low-income, vulnerable sections of the local population.

3 STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE FARC GUERRILLA WAR IN COLOMBIA

Initially, the FARC planned to wage a full-scale war against government forces, but after a series of defeats, the organization changed tactics and switched to guerrilla actions, mainly in rural areas (Seleznev, 2003). That is, the fighters counted on a protracted rebel Maoist war (Mao Zedong considered guerrilla war to be the most efficient means of countering any authorities (dictatorial, colonial or occupational) and put forward the main idea of guerrilla war: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy retreats, we pursue" (Fearon, Laitin, 2003)) for the victory of the socialist revolution. The FARC immediately imposed tribute on the already extremely poor controlled population and began to expropriate the property of wealthy farmers. Ony would also take hostages from wealthy families to obtain ransom. The FARC actively used terror against dissent.

However, despite the certain success achieved, the FARC experienced financial difficulties since there was not enough money to maintain an army of several thousand people and purchase weapons. H. Arenas (FARC political commissar) convinced Marulanda (FARC commander in chief) that the fight should be conducted taking into account national specifics, i.e. the organization will have to get involved in both the drug business and racketeering. This experience was later used in Russia in the mid-late 1990s when the armed units of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria were actively involved in the organization of drug trafficking.

At the 7th Guerrilla Conference in 1982, the FARC decided to introduce a "revolution tax" on large cocaine producers (Ferro, Uribe, 2002). Later, the FARC-EP started their coca plantations, and
also began to “protect” the peasants who grew and processed it, established their drug trafficking routes, and organized dealer networks in the United States. Over time, such activities led to a break between the FARC-EP and the Communist Party, but the latter did not oppose the FARC-EP in its print media and did not support accusations against it (Ferro, Uribe, 2002).

By that time, the Colombian drug lords had become almost a ruling class (Potapov, 2012), organized into two rival cartels - Medellin and Cali. The FARC-EP and the drug cartels went for an operational rapprochement, the government troops and the police were no longer capable of anything, but the anti-communist resistance was gaining strength. The resistance was offered by paramilitary formations - far-right farmer volunteer units - Field Workers Self-Defenders of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU) - and urban death squads (Potapov, 2012).

At the same time, the government forces acted on the side of ACCU, while drug lords were on the side of FARC-EP. It was the ACCU who defeated the Medellin drug cartel in 1993 and shot the legendary Pablo Escobar and his brother Roberto. After that, there was a war for the drug heritage between the ultra-left and the ultra-right. Since then, the level of political violence in Colombia has become incomparable with that in the rest of Latin America (Potapov, 2012).

At the end of the 20th century, the FARC-EP was prospering, with 17 thousand fighters, supported by a significant part of the impoverished population - the so-called “civilian militia” supplying them with food, medicine, and information. The guerilla fighters established an international network capable of maintaining operational communication with other states and ideological allies, controlled almost 45% of the state’s territory, and carried out military operations in the capital (Ortiz, 2002).

In this territory, the FARC-EP created a Marxist quasi-state, where there was no private property or a banking system, but the population was simultaneously provided with a minimum package of social services. A similar quasi-state (without a banking system, but with private property) was created to counter Bolshevism in May 1921 on the territory of the modern Tambov region of the Russian Federation called the Provisional Democratic Republic of the Tambov Partisan Territory, which had its own United Partisan Army that consisted of 50 thousand people.

4 ARDUOUS PATH TO RECONCILIATION

From time to time, the Colombian government attempted to come to an understanding with the radical left rebel groups. In particular, in August 1984, the Conservative President Belisario Betancur Cuartas managed to reach an agreement with the rebels on a ceasefire for a year, a mixed commission was created to discuss the disarmament and reconciliation process, and some of the rebels embarked on a legal political struggle. However, not all partisan movements used the agreements, although the Democratic Union M-19 managed to get 27.5% and take second place in the country in the elections to the Constitutional Assembly in Dec. 1990. However, the widespread ultra-right terror (the Patriotic Union, just created in April 1985 on the initiative of the FARC-EP, lost more than 2,000 activists and two leaders) canceled out government efforts to achieve national reconciliation (Chumakova, 2002).
As Andrés Pastrana Arango won the 1998 presidential election with support from all conservative movements, the search for a path to national reconciliation in Colombia resumed. For the implementation of the corresponding program of modernization of the country - Plan Colombia, 7.5 billion dollars were allocated. USA (Pataquiva, 2009) (several times more than for all social programs combined), which was supposed to ensure both the peace process itself and monetarist stabilization of the economy, anti-drug strategy, lowering the cost of living, and reform of the justice system.

However, Pastrana and his team were unable to fulfill these intentions, in the negotiations the president showed a lack of will and political weakness, allowing the guerrillas to dictate conditions to the government. Thus, to create a demilitarized zone between the guerrillas and government forces, the president even agreed to withdraw the latter from the 42-thousand-km² territory in southern Colombia, where FARC-EP felt like rightful masters (Pataquiva, 2009).

Since the guerrillas continued to take hostages, staged terrorist attacks, and invaded the demilitarized zone throughout the negotiation process, Pastrana decided to end dialogue with the rebels, and the war resumed. Likewise, B. Yeltsin and his team in Aug. 1996 agreed to sign the Khasavyurt Accord with representatives of the armed formations of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the result of which was not only the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of federal troops of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Chechen Republic but also an intensive spread of religious extremism and terrorism, the main focus of which at that time was in Chechnya, as well as the continuation of the practice of taking hostages and demanding ransom. The consequence of the invasion of Chechen armed units into the territory of the neighboring Republic of Dagestan in the summer of 1999 was the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) in the North Caucasus in 1999-2009 - the so-called Second Chechen war, the active combat phase of which ended in the spring of 2000, but another nine years passed before its full completion.

Under the leadership of President V.V. Putin, Russia finally put an end to the Islamist guerilla movement in the North Caucasus, although some of its echoes are still found, and Colombia entered the third millennium as a failed state: economic collapse, political incapacity, social disintegration, and criminal extremist terror, AUC, FARC-EP, ELN, and other illegal armed groups, permanently settling disputes with each other (Ivanovskii, 2013).

It was precisely due to unsuccessful peace negotiations that the "Uribe effect" emerged: the victory in the 2002 presidential elections of the leader of the Colombia First movement and the former mayor of Medellin, Alvaro Uribe Velez. A decade earlier, Velez lost his father during a kidnapping attempt by FARC-EP militants, and therefore during the election campaign claimed that he rejected a peaceful solution to the conflict with the guerrillas, and negotiations were possible only if the guerrillas completely ceased fire and laid down their arms (Echandia, 2008). Immediately after the inauguration, Uribe, following V.V. Putin's example, said that there was no armed conflict in Colombia, but a fight against terrorism was being waged.

Uribe initiated the Anti-terrorist statute, by analogy with the CTO regime in the North Caucasus in Russia, which provided the authorities with the necessary tools to prevent terrorist acts, in particular
the right to create “rehabilitation zones” in areas engulfed in armed confrontation, where administrative and other functions were assigned to the army, police and special forces. The police were able to intercept and register private correspondence without a preliminary court order, and in special circumstances, conduct a detention and search without a court order. The army took control of all the main highways of the country, and operational information about the actions of the militants began to flow through a special anti-terrorist phone line (Gómez, 2016).

At the same time, the Colombian Defense Ministry’s "Take Back Your Place" campaign was launched in August 2002 to help demobilize members of illegal military formations and prevent the forced recruitment of youth into their ranks. By the end of 2005, nearly 4,000 FARC-EP fighters, 1,100 ELN partisans, 2,752 ultra-right militants, and 156 other members of illegal groups had laid down their arms. Thanks to the cooperation of former insurgents and militants with the police, 25 hostages were released, 39 tons of dynamite, one million 300 thousand cartridges, about two million automatic rifles were confiscated (Gutiérrez, 2012). A similar instrument of amnesty was repeatedly used in the USSR for ordinary members of the Ukrainian anti-Soviet partisan formations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (six amnesties for the period 1944-49), ordinary members of the Lithuanian anti-Soviet partisan formations, the so-called "forest brothers" (the amnesty of 1955), as a result of which tens of thousands of people returned to a peaceful life.

In 2003, the Colombian government entered into a formal peace agreement with the ultra-right AUC, which was supposed to demobilize 20 thousand militants and end its drug trade, but its implementation was hampered by the demand of the AUC command to hold a general amnesty for the group’s members, which the authorities could not agree to as a matter of principle. It got to the point that in the same year, the FARC-EP and the AUC negotiated unification "against authoritarian rule" (Gutiérrez, 2012).

In general, while the area of operation of ultra-right militants under the Uribe presidency has slightly expanded and covered 39% of the country’s territory, the FARC-EP and ELN guerrilla zones have significantly decreased. In the wake of the successes in December 2005, Uribe even accepted the offer of international mediators - France, Spain, and Switzerland - to withdraw troops from the southwestern outskirts of Colombia - the “fiefdom” of the FARC-EP and expressed his readiness to sit down at the negotiating table with the leadership (Hernández, 2013). However, the latter did not respond to the presidential initiative, citing the factual incompleteness of the AUC disarmament process.

Therefore, although Uribe’s policy could not eliminate terrorism, it yielded significant results, restoring the people’s confidence in the authorities and reviving their hope for an improvement in the situation in the country. The territory controlled by the FARC-EP was reduced by half, and programs to support peasants began to be implemented, the purpose of which was to replace the cultivation of coca with the cultivation of non-narcotic plants. After the first two years of Uribe’s presidency, the number of murders in the country has more than halved, and the number of kidnappings has decreased from three thousand to a thousand cases (Gutiérrez, 2012).
The re-election of Alvaro Uribe on 28 May 2006 for a second presidential term violated the then-dominant Latin American tendency for left/center-left leaders to come (or return) to power (the "left trend") in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Guyana, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay, and Chile.

The FARC-EP was driven into a deep defensive position. On 4 Nov. 2011, the FARC-EP was headed by supporters of the strict force of Commander Timoleon Jimenez (another pseudonym - Commander Timochenko, in honor of USSR Marshal S.K. Timoshenko) and Ivan Marquez. However, over the next years, more than a hundred field guerrilla commanders were eliminated by the actions of the mobile detachments of the government special forces, the number of FARC-EP was halved - to eight or nine thousand people, the rank and file often refused to go into battle (Valenzuela, 2018).

Since Alvaro Uribe could not run for a third presidential term, the leader, in the wake of his popularity, appointed the "successor" Manuel Santos, who became President of Colombia on 29 Jun. 2010 in the second round of the presidential election. In general, Manuel Santos continued the internal policy of Alvaro Uribe, but if Uribe believed in a final military victory over the FARC-EP, then the new president did not have such confidence. Realizing that the continuation of the war even against the very weakened guerrillas would lead to new casualties among the civilian population, the President of Colombia decided to negotiate directly with the leadership of the FARC-EP regarding the signing of a peace treaty.

The first round of negotiations took place in Oslo on 18 Oct. 2012 (Valenzuela, 2019), then the negotiations were moved to Havana. However, on 23 Aug. 2013, Manuel Santos recalled the negotiators from Cuba due to disagreements between the parties over the execution of the agreement: the Colombian authorities planned to submit the FARC-EP demands to a popular referendum, and the guerrilla leaders, in turn, demanded the convening of a constituent assembly to amend the constitution in accordance with the agreements reached. The Colombian President then stressed that the government would return to the negotiation process when it saw fit.

At that time, hostilities in the country had practically ceased, the next presidential elections were imminent, and Manuel Santos successfully combined the announcement of his intention to run for a second term with the resumption of negotiations on 20 Sep. 2013. In June 2014, Manuel Santos won a landslide victory in the presidential election, and the constructive course of the negotiations, personally secured by the President of Colombia, culminated in the unveiling of a joint communique by Manuel Sánchez and Timoleon Jimenez in Havana on 23 Sep. 2015.

In the presence of Raul Castro, the parties announced their intention to sign a full-fledged peace treaty next March. The rebels and government troops ceased hostilities, it was planned to create a special judicial body - a tribunal of Colombian and foreign judges, which was to consider crimes committed during the armed conflict. Moreover, legal responsibility was to extend to all participants in the Civil War, including government military personnel, while the rebels were promised a broad amnesty (Valenzuela, 2019).
The negotiation process, complicated by decades of mutual accusations and suspicions, proceeded with difficulty, so the peace agreement on a final ceasefire, disarmament of militants, their security guarantees was signed in Havana by Manuel Sanchez and Timoleon Jimenez only on 23 Jun. 2016, the chairman of the State Council of Cuba Raul Castro acted as the guarantor of the agreements reached (Zambrano, 2019). Manuel Santos has publicly promised the FARC-EP rebels a humane trial. After the signing of the basic text of the agreement, scheduled for September, warned the President of Colombia, the agreement must be approved by the people in a referendum. Timoleon Jimenez was against this idea, remembering the war crimes committed by the guerillas, but in the end, agreed.

5 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE END OF CONFLICT AND CREATION OF STABLE AND LASTING PEACE

The agreement solemnly authorized on 26 Sep. 2016 in Cartagena is a rather voluminous document that regulates in detail the process of the country's exit from the state of a prolonged civil war. First, the agreement contains a mutual cessation of the war, and the FARC-EP pledged to lay down arms under UN control within six months, to stop the production and sale of drugs. For its part, the Colombian government must complete agrarian reform in the interests of the land-poor and landless peasants, who have always been the foundation of the guerrilla movement (Cáceres, 2013).

FARC-EP received the right to legally integrate into the political system of Colombia, creating a political party to participate in the elections. Moreover, this party should automatically receive five mandates in both chambers of parliament within two terms of its convocation, regardless of the election results. Guerrilla prisoners are subject to an amnesty, just like those who laid down their arms, but the amnesty does not apply to persons guilty of drug-related crimes as well as war crimes.

Such crimes should be tried by a specially created court the jurisdiction of which also includes cases of crimes committed by government forces. The agreement provides for a maximum sentence of eight years for the perpetrators, but not in the form of incarceration or imprisonment. During the term of punishment, the perpetrators must, by their own efforts, compensate for the harm that they have caused to a particular community, that is, essentially engage in community service. Ultimately, the FARC-EP pledged to indemnify those affected by their actions. In general, it can be argued that the agreement is a fairly comprehensive document aimed at completely ending the long-term civil war (Cáceres, 2013).

The question of the popular referendum, scheduled for 2 Oct. 2016, was formulated clearly and unequivocally: “Do you support a final agreement to end the conflict and establish a stable and lasting peace?” A powerful propaganda campaign was launched by the government to approve the agreement, it was supported by almost all political parties in the country from socialists and the “green” party to conservatives, most of the print and electronic media.

The agreement had as much support outside Colombia: from the UN leadership to the heads of all Latin American states, finally, Pope Francis also voted for the agreement's approval in a referendum.
The faction of opponents of the peace agreement with the FARC-EP was headed by the former "chief" and political mentor of Manuel Santos - ex-President of Colombia Alvaro Uribe. All the claims of the opponents of the peace agreement could be divided into two groups: in terms of the FARC-EP itself as a military-political organization and in terms of the text of the document. Complaints directly against the FARC-EP included their destructive role in fueling civil war and repeatedly disrupting peace negotiations, establishing drug trafficking (some experts believed that in the 1990s the organization was the largest drug cartel in the world), taking hostages for ransom, expropriation of private property, the mobilization of adolescents into insurgent units (according to human rights organizations, young people accounted for up to 25% of the staff (Cáceres, 2013)), the existence of sexual slavery in the ranks of the FARC-EP, repression against the Indian population of the Andean region.

As for the claims to the content of the peace agreement, the dissenters noted that the agreement left unpunished the FARC-EP militants guilty of committing crimes since the latter were not in danger of imprisonment. Moreover, in this matter, Alvaro Uribe and his supporters found support from the so-called "international human rights organizations" - Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which usually present themselves as opponents of any use of force. However, in Colombia, the organizations strongly challenged the peace agreement because they believed the document left the perpetrators of serious war crimes unpunished and thereby violated the rights of victims (Valenzuela, 2018).

The opponents of the agreement also argued that the agreement would legalize an insurgent organization related to drug trafficking, and President Manuel Santos violated the constitutional provisions when signing the peace treaty since the main law of the state does not say anything about any parliamentary quotas (except for two senatorial mandates for Indian communities). In the end, Uribe and his supporters frightened fellow citizens by the fact that communist Cuba acted as a mediator in the negotiation process, the agreement was actively supported by the Venezuelan leadership, so Colombia faced the threat of the seizure of power by the FARC-EP, which accumulated considerable financial resources from the sale of drugs.

The results of the 2 Oct. 2016 referendum came as a blow not only to the Colombian government but to all international media and political elites. As the vote count showed, only 49.78% of the referendum participants voted for the approval of the peace agreement, and 50.22% against (the difference was less than 54 thousand votes out of 13 million ballots), the voter turnout was extremely low and amounted to only 37.43% (Valenzuela, 2018). In areas dominated by the FARC-EP during the civil war, the majority voted in favor of the peace agreement, and in the interior departments, little affected by the hostilities, the majority voted against.

Nevertheless, the government said that the dialogue with the FARC-EP would continue and a new peace agreement would be prepared. The leadership of the rebels, in turn, noted that they would adhere to the text of the document and not resume hostilities, as it had repeatedly happened in the past after the collapse of the agreements.
Despite protests in the faction of Alvaro Uribe supporters, the peace process in the country continued and ended with logical formalization in a new agreement signed on 24 Nov. 2016 in Bogota by Manuel Santos and Timoleon Jimenez. The parties took into account the lesson learned and went to the approval of the peace agreement by the parliament without holding a referendum. On 30 Nov. 2016, not a single vote was found in both houses of the Colombian Parliament against the peace agreement, which was ratified and came into force (Valenzuela, 2018). Compared to the previous one, the new document provides for the FARC-EP's mandatory declaration of their property and transferring it to compensate for payments to victims of the armed conflict, setting a 10-year term for the transitional legal system, militants providing comprehensive information about their involvement in drug trafficking. Moreover, it was stated that the peace agreement as a whole would not be part of the state's constitution (Valenzuela, 2018).

However, as it is sung in a song written in the USSR for the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution (1967):

Beats Nabat, beats Nabat L'Internationale,
La llama de Octubre en los ojos del luchador.
Hay un comienzo para la Revolución,
¡La Revolución no tiene fin!

On the one hand, more than 250 ex-combatants have been killed since the signing of the agreement between the Colombian government and the rebels. On the other hand, according to Colombian intelligence, by June 2020, the total number of rebel groups (the so-called “dissidents” of the FARC) reached 4.6 thousand people, of which 2.6 thousand are fighters (The number of "dissidents" trying to revive FARC is growing, 2020). The group is trying to regain control of the former FARC's illegal economy, gain a foothold in coca-growing areas, and hold onto transportation routes and distribution channels. The insurgents lack a unified leadership and are merely a collection of field commanders who coordinate operations and divide territory. The largest group (about three thousand people) is subordinate to Miguel Botache Santillano (alias Gentil Duarte), who commanded the “Eastern bloc” in FARC which was its largest front.

6 CONCLUSION

There was no alternative to a peaceful resolution of the armed conflict in Colombia. In this respect, the interesting historical experience of the Latin American state in ending the civil war, both positive and negative, can be useful in the successful resolution of internal armed conflicts in other regions of the world. Some of its aspects should also be critically considered by the leadership of Ukraine, neighboring the Russian Federation, in the context of a civil armed conflict with the quasi-state formations of the Luhanska People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic in the east of the country.
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